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Abstract 
This Article aiming to discuss about recent Human Right Situation of Uyghur People in 
Xinjiang Province and the logic of powerful and structural effort by Beijing’s Authority to push 
“De-Extrimification” through “Strike Hard” program. A situation where, non-Chinese 
societies being forced to conform to Chinese culture, particularly that of the ethnic Han 
majority. The policies, politically seems like a will to annihilate identity of a society to 
determine their destiny, and to re-establish themselves in future generations. This writing also 
eager to examine, what was the driving factor the radicalism acts which has been occur in 
Xinjiang since over centuries, that this Radicalis has dragging the Chinese government to put 
the Policies on stage and seems not going to be downwarded. Using, Descriptive Analityc 
methods, this article analize the Uyghur and Xinjiang situation with geo-politic, development 
inequality and human security concepts. 
Key Word : Xinjiang Human Right Violation, Development Inequality, Geopolitic, 
Radicalism 
Abstrak 
Artikel ini bertujuan untuk membahas tentang Situasi Hak Asasi Manusia Penduduk Uyghur 
baru-baru ini di Provinsi Xinjiang dan logika upaya kuat dan struktural oleh Otoritas Beijing 
untuk mendorong "De-Ekstrimifikasi" melalui program "Strike Hard". Situasi di mana, 
masyarakat non-Cina dipaksa untuk menyesuaikan diri dengan budaya Cina, khususnya yang 
berasal dari etnis Han. Kebijakan-kebijakan tersebut, secara politis Nampak seperti sebuah 
usaha untuk menghilangkan identitas masyarakat untuk menentukan nasib mereka, dan untuk 
membangun kembali diri mereka di generasi mendatang. Tulisan ini juga ingin menguji, apa 
faktor pendorong tindakan radikalisme yang telah terjadi di Xinjiang sejak berabad-abad lalu 
hingga kini, Artikel disusun menggunakan, metode analisis deskriptif dengan menggunakan 
perspektif geo-politik, ketidakadilan pembangunan dan Human Security.  
 
Kata Kunci: Pelanggaran HAM Xinjiang, Ketimpangan Pembangunan, Geopolitik, 
Radikalisme. 
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A. Introduction 
In contemporary global political 
dynamics, these late two decades, China 
had shows a grand accomplishment of not 
only economic development, but also 
attempts to present the world as a global 
center of new powers, characterized by 
some principles of foreign policy such as 
the One Belt One Road (OBOR), as well 
as its effort to claim the South China Sea. 
Along with its broaden and massive 
economic changes and development, 
human right violence were also 
prominently recorded. China's attempts to 
use military power and a series of 
repressive policies primarily against 
minority citizens, driven by the China self 
proclaimed of radical and separatism 
cleansing motives under the supremacy of 
communist ideology and policy. The 
tragedy of the Tibetan people, and the 
Falun Gong group left the marks of trauma 
trails of violence in China in the process of 
Nation-Building shaping.  
Xinjiang, one of the largest provinces 
in China, has been home to millions of 
Uyghurs belonging to China's authoritative 
territory since 1949. Half of the 26 million 
inhabitants in the Region are Muslim. 
Xinjiang is one of the provinces in China 
where separatist groups have been in 
action demanding independence since the 
end of the 1940s.conflict began to get 
international attention after the bus 
bombing incident 2009 in Urumqi, where 
the separatist group East Turkistan 
Independence Movement (ETIM) Muslim 
by the Chinese government was 
considered as the most responsible party. 
This riots involving Hans and Uyghurs 
ethnic in Urumqi, mutually attacking each 
other bussines center (Clarke,2010). 
Ethnic dimension between the 
Uyghurs and Han embodied a far greater 
description of ethnic groups tentions 
opposing the State and all policies 
implemented in the Xinjiang region. The 
conflict raised a lot about the resistance of 
the Uyghurs in Xinjiang under Chinese 
rule. Since then, studies of the conflict 
situation in Xinjiang have been 
increasingly productive. The violence in 
Urumqi which represented tensions 
between ethnic Uyghurs and Han, 
apparently is not the first time exploded. In 
1997, Chinese people were shocked by 
large-scale demonstrations, chaos and bus 
bombings involving Uyghur insurgents as a 
form of protest against the Chinese 
government and demands for 
independence (Dillon, 1997). 
These rebellion warns the 
government, labelling it as a separatism 
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and terrorism in the Xinjiang region, 
towards the Uyghur community which is 
furtherly responded with the establishment 
of controversial “Strike Hard” program In 
May 2014 (Hughes, 2018).  This policy 
was articulated into a series of strict 
disciplinary actions against the Uyghur 
community. There have been many reports 
both by individuals and humanitarian 
working group, proclaiming the strong 
suspicion that, in order to discipline the 
Uyghur, gradually the Chinese 
Government established political 
education camps, and a pretrial detention 
center. 
Both facilities, by the Chinese 
government, are recognized as centers of 
training and education for nation character 
building. An educational process aimed at 
preventing and eradicating ideological 
viruses of separatism and radicalism. This 
article discusses the complexity of the 
conflict in Xinjiang into 4 Discussion. The 
first part will trace the background of 
China's De-Extremization policy towards 
Xinjiang and other forms of radicalism that 
legitimize the birth of the "hard beat" 
policy.  
Second part of the article elaborate 
the discussion of China's geopolitical and 
geo-economic interests in the Xinjiang 
region, as a rational factor driving the birth 
of disciplinary programs in political camps 
held. In the third part, this article will look 
at Xinjiang natural resourse 
abundancseinto the framing Endegenous 
Economic growth. The fourth section, 
discussing about the correlation of 
development inequality in Xinjiang as a 
main driven factor into radicalism raises 
related to human security theory. 
 
B. Tracing the China’s De-
ekstrimization policy and Story of 
Separatism act in Xinjiang. 
 
The latest report on Human Rights 
Watch, in 2018 entitled Eradicating 
Ideological Virusses, explained that since 
the Strike Hard policy was implemented, 
the number of officially captured Uyghurs 
has tripled compared to 2009. The 
arresting carried out based on suspicions, 
although without clear evidence and 
stages. This formula of “education” 
entitling by the Xinjiang Chinese 
Communist Youth League as an "Effective 
Crime Measures" actions to eradicate 
thoughts about religious extremism and 
terrorism, and ideological diseases. It has 
been multireported, that this form of 
policies somehow performs the practices 
of violence indoctrination. 
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 The official, set the conduction of 
Data collecting on Uyghurs, without 
consent. And those who suspected 
according to the government determination 
then imprisoned into the "Education" 
camps to undergo political indoctrination, 
for undetermined periode (Human Right 
Watch, 2018).  
Although the Chinese government 
does not provide open information about 
the number of prisoners in these camps, a 
credible estimation says  that the number 
of people in these camps is around one 
million (Zen, 2018). 
In 2018, Human Rights Watch 
interviewed 58 Uyghurs people, reported 
that half or more members family were 
prisoned in a pre-trial detainees, without 
clear legal procedures, rendering the 
separation between family members in a 
prominent number (HRW,2018). The 
Xinjiang authorities also carry out 
compulsory biometric data collection, such 
as voice and DNA samples, to identify, 
create profiles, and tracking everyone in 
Xinjiang.  
CERD investigative findings which 
was reported at the World Uyghur 
Congress 2018  forum, outlining some 
forms of human rights violations which 
forced the Uyghurs neglected their 
fundamental rights to actuate their cultural 
value system. In the name of "de-
extremification", some policies on "De-
extremification" which seen by how it 
goes, perceively targetted the moslem 
community in Xinjiang (CERD, 2018). 
The policies set these package of 
prohibition as association, into 
“extremification”. Those are: Wearing 
clothing with face coverings; growing  
“irregular beards”; bearing symbols of 
“extremification”; publishing or 
possessing information with “extremist 
content”. The parents also prohibited from 
choosing 28 baby names for their children 
under the legislation; Uyghurs under the 
age of 18 are not able to enter mosques to 
pray or take part in religious activity 
(Long, 2014).  
Also, by this regulation, religious 
sites are monitored as well as religious 
ceremonies, such as Ramadhan practices 
becoming more restricted nowadays. 
Mosques are now highly regulated and 
supervised under the guise of a “Mosque 
Rectification Campaign” over the last half 
of 2016 (Long, 2014). These forms of 
oppression are figuring a multidimensional 
threat to the existence of Uyghur Ethnic 
identity.  
Not only constitute in the context 
religiousity and cultural banned, each 
dimension of Uyghur society seems to be 
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banned by the authority. In the field of 
Education, for example, the Chinese 
government limits educational curricula 
that teach native language and culture to 
Uyghurs (Amelia, 2015). In the detention 
camps, prisoners are forced to study, sing 
praises to the Chinese Communist Party, 
and memorize rules that applied 
particularly to Turkish Muslims. The 
detainees will not be released before being 
confirmed as loyal Chinese citizens.  
Those who are outside experienced 
none the better. They were asked to attend 
a routine political indoctrination meetings. 
A number of testimonies from Uyghur 
revealed that in the process of 
indoctrination of communism Education 
were obviously intended (Meixler, 2018; 
Turkel, 2018, UHRP : 2017, Schmitz,  
2018). A number of reports also explained 
that torture, kinda like being electrocuted, 
beaten and various other forms of violence 
awaits those who disobey (Meixler,2018). 
Responding to this, Adrian Zen from 
the European School of Culture and 
Theology the dynamics over China‟s 
Policy towards Xinjiang‟s Uyghurstated 
that using the term "Pacification", referring 
to the contemporary situation in Xinjiang 
is currently the most intense form of state 
violence against its people. He Wrote : 
“China‟s pacification drive in 
Xinjiang is, more than likely, the 
country‟s most intense campaign of 
coercive social re-engineering since 
the end of the Cultural 
Revolution,..“The state‟s proclaimed 
„war on terror‟ in the region is 
increasingly turning into a war on 
religion, ethnic languages and other 
expressions of ethnic identity,” (Zen, 
2018). 
The government pleaded their action 
as a rational choice by considering the 
history of Xinjiang uprising insurgency by 
the Uyghurs, which is already occurred  
even since the Qing Dynasty ruled (Dillon, 
2014; Tschantret, 2016). And by the times 
goes by, the insurgency strategies of 
Uyghur freedom movement appears to 
evolve closer to the terrorism 
characteristic. 
Although in the 1997 bombing case, 
the Turkish-based Organization for East 
Turkistan Freedom claimed to be a 
responsible party, the tension has given  
the Chinese government, measures to 
declare the Uyghur people as a dangerous 
group, reflecting on the understanding that 
Uyghurs had psychological and ethnic, 
racial, religious and culture bounding with 
Turkish people. 
This radicalist claim on Uyghur 
has begun to investigated since 1998. It 
becomes intensely campaigned by China 
after the events of 11 September 2001 
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(CERD,2018;Human Right Watch, 2018). 
Seems that, his labelling has been being 
used as a justifier of Tiongkok repressive 
policies which has threaten the cultural 
and religious identity of the Uyghur 
community.  
 
C. Xinjiang’s Natural Resources;  
Framing of Endogenous Economic 
Growth  
Studies by experts on the Xinjiang 
conflict, dominantly argues the conflict 
based on the humanitarianism, human 
security, human rights violations 
perspectives. But deliberating the internal 
conflict between state and its own 
civiliianz over development process, 
geopolitical and geoeconomic studies are 
hardly to ignore. A popular adage states 
that geography without politics is just a 
map without meaning. Political geography, 
in its broadest sense, is an academic study 
of all variations in resource conflicts and 
the way in which they are resolved 
(Blacksell, 2006: 1). 
Understanding of the elements of 
space are the fundamental factors into 
policy making process of a state both 
internally and internationally oriented 
(national and foreign policy). This thesis 
has also been long held by some global 
geopolitical thinking, for example 
Nicholas J. Spyman in his 1938 work : 
"In such a world, the geographic 
area of the territorial base that 
operates is a temporary armistice 
called peace. It is the most 
fundamental conditioning factor in 
the formulation of national policy 
because it is the most permanent 
...". 
A depth understanding, management, 
and mastery of territory or space in a  
political perspective has been well known 
is one of some key indicator of state 
power. By understanding the full area of 
sovereignty, a country will formulate a 
foreign policy strategy. The use of 
geopolitical and geo-economic analysis to 
understand China's case against the 
Uyghurs in Xinjiang is based on some 
considerations : First, Muslim population 
in China is not only disseminate in 
Xinjiang. But in other regions, there is no 
upheaval of separatism, and in other 
regions of Muslim populations both 
indigenous and immigrant from other 
countries, has not  experienced a ban to 
worship, cultural or other attributes related 
to their religious identity. 
Although religious education for 
children is officially forbidden by law in 
China, the Communist Party allows Hui 
Muslims to have their children educated in 
Islam and attend mosques; the law is only 
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enforced for Uyghurs. After secondary 
education, China allows Hui students to 
study with an imam (Alles, et. Al, 2003). 
China does not enforce the law against 
children attending mosques on non-
Uyghurs outside Xinjiang Since the 1980s 
Islamic private schools which is well 
known as sino-Arabic school shave been 
permitted by the Chinese government in 
Muslim areas. Hui Muslims employed by 
the state, are allowed to fast during 
Ramadan (Beech, 2014). The number of 
Hui going on Hajj is expanding and Hui 
women are allowed to wear veils, but 
Uyghur women are discouraged from 
wearing them. These facts encircling an 
understanding that the internal Conflict in 
Xinjiang can not be over simpilified as a 
conflict occurs between ideology (Islamic 
vs Communist). 
Second, prior to this modern era, 
Xinjiang has already imprinted into 
warlord rivalry and exposed to competition 
by a variety of political formations. The 
conflict in Xinjiang is latent and if it is 
compared to other cases of ethnic 
discrimination and human rights violations 
in China, which is already existed along 
with of political civilization in Chinese 
history (Dillon 2004: 17-18, Millward 
2004: 2-4, Dwyer, 2005).  
The trace of Xinjiang's primacy has 
become easier to trace back since the 
history of the Qing dynasty. This earlier 
conquest by the Qing dynasty was not 
economically motivated, but only oriented 
towards security and building defenses in 
the northwestern region of China 
(Millward, 2007; Clarke, 2008).  
Historically, under the Qing‟s rules, 
the concept of the „Great Leap West‟ has 
shown its intention to integrate Xinjiang 
through development. It was a Qing clerk 
in 1820 who called for investment of 
canals and windbreaks and the migration 
of Han peasants and Manchu bannermen to 
Xinjiang (Tyler 2003:202). 
But as what commonly ordered in 
most of imperialist rulings, the qing 
dynasty ruled Xinjiang with a strict 
feudalist imprealism which is led the 
populations from within Xinjiang felt 
exploited by local officials (Clarke, ibid). 
This treatment began to provoke anxiety 
and raising the seeds of resistance from 
Uyghur people at that time.  
In 1884 Xinjiang was officially 
conceived as a province of China. The 
reign continuously  pursuing full 
integration of Xinjiang, politically, 
culturally,economically, and ideologically. 
The history of this “Sinicization” has 
begun, since. At the current dynamics, the 
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form of this Sinicization has been evolved, 
in a different rigorous and opressure 
method. 
Third, in several state official 
statements and documents, Xinjiang is 
often stated as one of the central areas of 
"A Modern Silk Road" which has a mutual 
supportive relations with the Belt Road 
Initiative (BRI / OBOR) program. In the 
PRC government perspectives, asserts that 
Xinjiang has always been an integral part 
of China, recalls the history that this 
region was constituted a pivot in the trade 
routes of the fabled Silk Road, and thus 
functioned as a “cultural blotter” for  
different civilizations from the Middle 
East, Europe, the Indian subcontinent and 
China proper. As mentioned in PRC‟s 
Embassy 2003 White Document, titling 
“History and Development of Xinjiang” : 
“Since the Western Han Dynasty 
(206 B.C-24 A.D.), Xinjiang has 
been an inseparable part of the 
unitary multi-ethnic Chinese 
nation. The Chinese central 
governments of all historical 
periods exercised military and 
administrative jurisdiction over 
Xinjiang. (PRC White Paper, 
2003).” 
 
Initiated by the Chinese President Xi 
Jinping, OBOR objective is to build trade 
routes between China and the countries in 
Central Asia, Europe and Indo-Pacific 
littoral countries. Since the beginning of 
its initiation in 2013, OBOR has 
developed 6 corridors of infrastructure to 
support the goals of China's economic 
development, where the Central Asian 
Region countries are one of the 
development corridors. Fuller and Star 
(2016), in a report entitled The Xinjiang 
Problem, argued that Xinjiang, with its 
geographical position, was scheduled to be 
a link between China's political economic 
relations with central Asian countries. 
The history of Xinjiang's importance 
to modern China increased after the 1979 
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, which led 
to China's perception of being encircled by 
the Soviets (Clarke, 2011).  
The geographical position of 
Xinjiang, interest leaning perceiveness 
from the various of external powers 
encircling it, draws query about what 
values of potential does Xinjiang posses, 
invites the interest to the other state? This 
kind of question, has always logically 
explained in an economic-political 
analysis.  
Xinjiang has been already 
costumized as a transit area for energy 
transportation from the neighbouring 
Kazakhstan to China proper. Xinjiang 
itself possesses rich deposits of oil, natural 
gas, coal and non-ferrous metals, which is 
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alluring for exploration. Xinjiang has 40% 
of coal reserves, 22% of petroleum 
reserve, and 28% of gas reserve in the 
country.  
Besides that, the coal deposits in 
Xinjiang are of higher quality compared to 
deposits in other provinces, as it contains 
less sulfur, while the oil deposits are more 
accessible because most of them are 
located in shallow and middle strata oil-
reservoir. Oil-gas fields in Xinjiang are 
concentrated in Karamay, Tarim Basin, 
and Turfan Basin. They are three of 
China‟s major gas-oil fields in the land, 
and are among the most productive ones 
(CNPC: 2013). Some speculation stated 
that the Tarim Basin oil reserves may be 
as high as 74 billion barrels of oil and 282 
trillion cubic feet of gas (Hasan, 2000). 
But even though has a lot of 
potential, it deserves to be noted that 
Beijing may be overstating Xinjiang's oil 
potential. China measures oil reserves that 
are proven, but not necessarily recoverable 
(Chrostofferson, 1993 in Boehm, 2009). 
This potential seems to have been studied 
for a long time by the Chinese 
government, although before the facts 
about natural gas potential in Xinjiang 
were often exposed, the Chinese 
government has already construct some 
economic commodity based development 
program in Xinjiang, considering what this 
region mainly produce : Oil and Cotton. 
(Becquelin, 2000).  
Xinjiang's economic development 
has been very impressive since the 1990s. 
This was driven by the pattern of China's 
development after the cultural revolution 
which emphasized that economic 
development was a way to overcome 
socio-political problems, including one in 
Xinjiang But in 2006, there was a slight 
change in the focus of developing strategic 
economic commodities ahead of 2007. 
Oil exploration in Xinjiang was 
directed at supporting China's need for 
natural gas. China 2020 natural gas market 
demand will be around 350 billion m3, and 
580 billion in 2030 (Swennen, 2017). To 
meet the demand for gas, the Chinese 
government nneds to build a gas pipeline 
construction project, stretching from  
Xinjiang to gas producing countries 
in the Caucasian region, such as 
Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. As Asian 
power reports on January 2019 reported 
that the Chinese National Energy 
Administration (NEA) has given the green 
light for a new 4 Mt/year open-pit coal 
mining project in the Xinjiang autonomous 
region in northwestern China, which will 
benefit from a total investment of 
CNY854m (US$126m) (Asian Power, 
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2019). In 2018, the domestic raw coal 
production rose by 5.2% to nearly 3,550 
Mt, thus the China‟s pipeline network 
must reach 400 billion m3 /year in 2020, 
and 670 billion in 2030. At the end of 
2014 the transmission capacity of China‟s 
pipeline network stood at 240 billion m3. 
(Swennen, 2017). 
Xinjiang retains a rich abundance of 
natural resources, including oil, coal, and 
natural gas, and is also critically located, 
bordering much of Central Asia (Hayes 
and Clarke,2016 in Steinhauer, 2017). 
With Chinese direct investments in Central 
Asia reaching $250 billion (USD) in 2012, 
the country is seeking to strengthen these 
ties and its presence in the region through 
further development of oil and gas 
pipelines in Xinjiang to connect China to 
the region (Tukmadiyeva, 2013; Xinjiang 
Statistical Bureau, 2014). Since 1993, 
China has been a net importer of oil 
(Bovingdon 2010).  And as long as 
China‟s economy and booming population 
continue to grow at its current pace, so will 
its energy consumption-which has resulted 
in an increasing reliance on Xinjiang 
(Sheives 2006).  
Considering the geographical 
position and study of Xinjiang's energy 
potential, it seems rational and acceptable 
that China strives to maintain its territory 
and maintain the well-known security of 
Xinjiang, which never stops the turmoil by 
carrying out a hard strike policy. Peter 
Martin's investigative writing, 2019, on 
Bloomberg news describes the plans for 
China's government over Xinjiang, as 
follows: 
“Xinjiang sits at the geographic 
heart of Xi‟s signature Belt and 
Road Initiative. It's a trillion-dollar 
plan to finance new highways, 
ports and other modern 
infrastructure projects in 
developing countries that will 
connect them to China‟s markets. “ 
 
The government has spent vast sums 
of building up cities in Xinjiang to attract 
companies and fuel growth in the 
relatively poor region. Thus, concerns 
about lawlessness in Xinjiang could chill 
investment. Related to Figure 1, referring 
to the years when the dynamics of FDI 
were low or experienced a decline, it was 
noted that in those years the intensity of 
riots in the Xinjiang region tended to 
increase. China's campaign against the 
Uyghurs is aimed at providing a safe place 
to live and work for investors in Xinjiang.  
China has invested so much in this region. 
For this reason, to gain significant return 
on investment, however, China must not 
only have control of the region, but also 
political and economic stability favorable 
to investment. Figure 1 Shows The 
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Surveilance Economy of Security 
Investment Realted Value in Xinjiang 
becomes soaring in each year. 
Although overshadowed by radical 
separatism actions, the size of government 
spending on security and political 
education in Xinjiang seems reasonable 
due to the promising income. Enterprise 
Singapore, a Singapore-owned Enterprise 
engaged in Business investment, in 2017 
issued data on the potential promising 
economic value of Xinjiang global trade 
from year to year and in the future as can 
be seen in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 1. The Surveilance Economy of 
Security Investment Realted Value 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source : The World Street Journal, 2017. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 Trend of Xinjiang Export 
import Value (2010-2015) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source :  Xinjiang Statistical Yearbook, 
2017. 
 
The Xinjiang GDP value overviewed 
in 2008-2017, also recorded always higher 
than the national level as sown in Figure 3. 
To be noted well, along with this upward 
values of GDP, at the same years the trend 
of investment and absorption of Foreign 
Direct Investment has also been growing 
in Xinjiang. This increasing, cannot be 
reached suddenly without the impulse of 
previous development stimulus which was 
already implemented in the Great Leap 
West policy (discussed in the previous 
section) . 
Based on the theory of endogenous 
economic growth, the factors of political 
economic stability hold a strong influence 
in determining the smooth economic 
growth. As a refinement of neo-classical 
economic theory, endogenous growth 
theory provides a new theoretical line of 
thought in analyzing sources of growth. 
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This theory reveals that economic growth 
will be determined by a system that 
regulates the production process and not 
from other forces outside the system. 
 
Figure 3. Xinjiang GDP 2008-2017 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source : National Bureau of Statistics, The 
Economist (2018) 
The characteristics of endogenous 
growth models are all factors affecting 
economic growth. In this context, Drazen 
(2000) reveals that political economy sees 
economic performance as a reflection of 
endogenous political decisions, therefore 
incorporating political factors as factors 
that influence growth is very relevant. For 
Beijing, Xinjiang‟s stability depends on 
Uyghur integration within China‟s large 
family of nationalities. Integration implies 
a „political, cultural, social and economic 
structuring of a larger state that sees the 
minorities maintaining their own cultures 
and identities, but influenced by the 
majority and not seeking secession‟ 
(Clarke 2007b:262).  
 
Dana C. Boehm (2009) in his 
work, China's Failed War on Terror: 
Fanning the Flames of Uighur Separatist 
Violence, overwiewing the Xinjiang 
conflict in a contemporary geopolitical 
perspective. Boehm conclusion to  
Xinjiang significance is extracted 
from the histrorical occurrence that the 
region has shielded China from the Central 
Asia steppe invasion. And today Xinjiang 
provides an area of low population where 
military maneuvers and nuclear testing can 
be conducted (Harris,1993).  
 
D. Xinjiang Inequality of Development 
as a form of Human Security Issues . 
 
Despite Xinjiang‟s potential energy 
resources, and its large infrastructure 
development plan which will deplete state 
expenditure in trillions of yuan, the report 
by Raymond Lee (2014) shows an 
inequality tendency in Xinjiang. In his 
report, it was stated that until 2013, 19 
cases of violence by radical groups 
occurred in the Xinjiang region. This 
certainly does not count the attacks that 
occurred in 2015 and 2016. Considering 
the fact of Xinjiang's strategic position, 
value of manageable energy resources, 
contested to this existence of radicalist 
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actions, this dynamics simply represents 
an irony of development.  
Xinjiang‟s economy has grown at 
an impressive rate (Liu, 2017). Aggregate 
wages have increased by 470% (2.3 billion 
to 10.9 billion). Under the Great Leap 
West, Xinjiang has been subject to 
infrastructural projects, investment, and 
demographic transformation (Tyler 2003; 
Tian 2004). This modern developmental 
perspective continues to be choosen as a 
solution to answer the region‟s ethnic 
tensions, even in the aftermath of the 2009 
Urumqi riots. Lee's report on ethnic 
conflict is the irony of the development 
perspective offered by China. In 2009, 
Urumqi, the capital of Xinjiang province 
was notified as the site of the worst social 
unrest in China since the 1989 Tiananmen 
Incident (O‟Brien 2011). 
Amy H.liu's study (2017) plainly 
stated that using numerical analysis that 
one of the drivers of this instability is what 
is explained in the development discourse 
as Inequality of development. In the case 
of Xinjiang, even though capital flows 
have since been planted in the region, but 
indirectly, the government's decision to 
mobilize Han‟s Ethnic gradually but in 
large numbers is the main source of the 
tensions that have occurred in Xinjiang. So 
for the Uyghurs, the great leap is more 
likely to be a form of colonialism.  
Liu‟s research in 2017, measuring 
the Xinjiang development program using  
regression tools, which at a glance macro  
showed that the Han migrants have 
profited immensely from the development 
program, it seems that the Uyghurs have 
enjoyed the benefits as well. This is 
measured based on the amount of 
development, employment opportunities 
and the disruption in the economic 
structure. But tracing back more 
specifically at the demographic 
composition and ethnic involvement of the 
Uyghurs, the high absorption of labor or 
business opportunities is still dominantly 
felt by ethnic Han‟s, along with the 
increasing the Han‟s transmigrations in 
Xinjiang. Figure 4 illustrates the changes 
in ethnic demographic structures between 
Han and Uyghur. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Page 35 
Prodi Ilmu Hubungan Internasional FISIP UPN”Veteran” Jakarta 
 
 
 
MANDALA 
Jurnal Hubungan Internasional 
Vol.2 No.1  
Januari-Juni 
2019 
Figure 4. Changes in ethnic 
demographic structures between Han 
and Uyghur. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   Source : Liu (2017) 
At the beginning of China's 
independence in 1949, the Uyghurs 
represented over 75% of the total 
population; in contrast, the Hans only 
accounted for 7%. Today, Uyghurs 
represent only 46% of the total population.  
Conversely, the Hans are now at 
least 40% of the total Xinjiang population 
(Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region 
Bureau of Statistics 2010). In this 
situation, China faces development 
discourse as Development Inequality 
between Han and Uyghur ethnicity.   
Study of Zang (2011) stated that 
from the aspect of average income, in 
2011, Uyghurs earn 892 RMB/year, while 
Han is earning an average income of 1,141 
RMB/year. Also in the context of urban 
and rural settlement areas are just stark, 
where, the majority of Hans are 
concentrated in the more economically 
developed areas; the Uyghurs and Turkic 
peoples, in poorer regions (Wiemer 2004). 
Ethnic profiles are also prevalent in job 
hiring dynamics (Zang 2011). 
While the urban-rural income gap in 
Xinjiang is used to mirror that of the 
national average, today it is 30% higher 
(Cao 2010). Similar inequality portrayals 
were written by CERD-OHCR in the 2018 
investigation report, which includes the 
employment sector in companies, 
education, occupation, to wages : 
“ Rapidly developing industries 
including the energy service sector, 
and government positions are 
dominated by Han Chinese living in 
the region and Uyghurs are largely 
excluded from the benefits and 
employment opportunities on 
account of ethnicity and 
language…The  Xinjiang Production 
and Construction Corps (Bīngtuán), 
a state-controlled organization,  
 
 
 
employs upwards of 2.7 million 
people, though Uyghurs made up 
only seven percent of its workforce 
in 2014…. (CERD-OHCR,2018).” 
 
Inequality and discriminative 
education policies also occurs targeting 
Uyghurs education and cultural system are 
widespread. Curriculum for Uyghurs has 
deemphasized or eliminated teaching on 
language, culture and religion, and 
language policies in education continue to 
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erode the Uyghur language from a young 
age (CERD-OHCR,2018). The regional 
government has now set a target of 
2,600,000 students in East Turkestan by 
2020 which constitutes nearly all non-
Chinese students. To facilitate this 
language program, there has been a 
substantial influx of Han Chinese teachers 
incentivized to relocate to the region to 
work, while Uyghur teachers are fired or 
are not able to find jobs in education.  
In the field of security studies, the 
situation faced by the Uyghurs in 
Xinjiang, can be seen as a symptom 
“Human Insecurity” which is driven by 
uneven distribution in the vortex of 
developmentalization. Human security as 
an emerging paradigm for understanding 
global vulnerabilities whose proponents 
challenge the traditional notion of national 
security by arguing that the proper referent 
for security should be at the human rather 
than national level.  
At 1994  Human Development 
Report  by UNDP, define this concept of 
human security should be expanded to 
include threats in seven areas: Economy, 
Food, Health, Environmental, Personal, 
Community and Politcal Security that 
every Independence state should 
accommodate to their citizen. This 
definition has been broaden from earlier 
concept from military aspects into non 
military aspects, particularly the 
promotion of economic and justice of 
development (Mc Namara, 1968 in Sam, 
2002).  
Another inherent fundamental 
aspects in the conceptualization of human 
security is, Freedom Principles, which 
consists of Freedom From Fear and 
Freddom from Want.  While the facts in 
Xinjiang, the development policies along 
with the Detention programs run by 
China‟s Government thorughky violated 
this principles. The study of development 
relations with the creation of Human 
Security correlates each other. 
 "Freedom from fear" in Tadjbakhsh 
and Chenoy (2006) argument, means 
human development and human security 
are inextricably linked since progress in 
each one, enhances the chances of 
progress in another while failure in one 
increases risk of failure of another. 
Adopted from Tadjbakhsh, the correlation 
between Human security and  
Development bridged by five variables : 
Values; Orientation,Time Frame, General 
Objectives and Policy Goals. Description 
of the values of those 5 bridging variable 
shown in Table 1.  
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Table 1. Description of 5 bridging 
variables between Human Security and 
Development.  
 
Variable Human Development Human Security  
Values Well-being. 
Security, 
stability, 
sustainability of 
development 
gains 
 
Orientation 
Moves forward, is progressive 
and aggregate: “Together we 
rise” 
Looks at who 
was left behind 
at the individual 
level:  
Time 
Frame 
Long term 
short-term 
measures to deal 
with risks with 
long term 
prevention 
efforts. 
General 
objectives 
Growth with equity. 
Expanding the choices and 
opportunities of people to lead 
lives they value. 
Identification of 
risks, prevention 
to avoid them 
through dealing 
with root causes, 
preparation to 
mitigate them,. 
Policy 
goals 
Empowerment, sustainability, 
equity and productivity. 
Protection and 
promotion of 
human survival 
(freedom from 
fear), daily life 
(freedom from 
want), and the 
avoidance of 
indignities (life 
of dignity) 
 
Source : Adpted from Tadjbakshsh and 
Chenoy (2006) 
 
The values outlined in the relations 
of Human Security and Development are 
based on the facts, is a rarity in Xinjiang. 
This is could easily being understood as 
the main stimulant of small resistance 
from the Uyghur ethnic group, as 
indigenous people who embrace injustice 
in their own country. This situation by 
Jessica Stern, described in the term  
 
 
"simplify life", as the main factor that can 
trigger the attachment of the population of 
a nation into a group or form a separate 
group with the same flow of thought, the 
same suffering to find collective strength 
to find a life that is "easy "Rather than 
looking for a way out individually. As 
Stern said :  
"People join religious terrorist 
groups partly to transform 
themselves and to simplify life. They 
start out feeling humiliated, enraged 
that they are viewed by some 'others 
second class.... The weak become 
strong.. “ (Stern, 2003, 2004). 
 
People join terrorism groups to vent 
their fatigue in facing various forms of 
social system injustice and by gathering, 
they will feel strong and feel able to fight. 
The victim role aswell as longstanding 
historical injustices and grievances may be 
constructed to serve as justifications for 
terrorism (bjorgo, 2005). 
For example, perhaps, the most 
rigorous formalization of group conflict 
(and state capacity more broadly) that 
integrates many of the causal variables 
from existing studies, such as 
redistributive institutions (that may, for 
example, stem from differences in ethnic 
fragmentation and/or political institutions), 
taxation, and unearned income omits 
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international factors completely (Besley 
and Persson 2009, 2010, 2011). 
The high prevalence of deprivation 
and the degrading of human rights are the 
main drivers that motivate someone to 
gather or join a terror group. Data from the 
UNDP Human Development Index 
presents data on the correlation between 
human rights violations against the 
involvement of individuals into a terrorism 
group.  Figure  5 shows that Poverty has a 
low correlation to terrorism or radicalism. 
Eventhough,, unresolved poverty 
could drive unemployment and the 
injustice feeling of the society. The people 
will become more susceptible to the false 
promises of those who favor terrorists 
methods to bring about social and political 
change (Schmid in Bjorgo, 2005).  
Contrary to poverty, violations of human 
rights are so high in correlation with one's 
involvement in terrorism groups as can be 
seen in figure 6. The better the handling of 
human rights of a social system, the lower 
the prevalence of involvement of social 
entities in radical activities.  
The logic between inequality of 
development and the proliferation of 
radical resistance, can clearly illustrate the 
dynamic conflict in Xinjiang. Two large 
narratives appear to emerge. The narrative 
or perspective of the Uyghur community, 
violence is a daily dynamic that must be 
faced, and complicates their living space. 
in their perspective, they become 
indigenous people who are marginalized  
in the land by the capital flows and 
development policies. Violence against 
Uyghurs in Xinjiang has also transformed 
from non-physical, where they experience 
multidimensional discrimination, into 
physical violence which contitutes the key 
elements of radicalism raising. 
Figure 5. Correlation Between Poverty 
and Terrorism by UNDP 
 
 
 
 
 
Source : UNDP, (2016). 
 
Figure 6. Correlation between 
preservation of Human Right and 
Terrorism 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source : UNDP (2016) 
 
The second narrative, the Chinese 
government considers that integrating 
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Xinjiang is to maintain territorial integrity 
and China's sovereignty. On the other 
hand, the geo-economic aspect of 
Xinjiang's important position, is the main 
element determining the success/ 
smoothness of China's geo-political mega-
projects summarized in the OBOR.  
Therefore Xinjiang security is very 
important to be realized. The existence of 
radicalism will disrupt all these narratives. 
So that in the response of the Chinese 
government, fertile radicalism must be 
overcome with "discipline" as now 
reflected in the "Strike Hard" policy 
contestation.  
This article, then construct the logic 
of all of these narration simply, in the 
author's arrangement into a conceptual 
thingking  exposed  in chart 1 below 
Chart 1.  The logic of Violence, 
Development Inequality, Strike Hard 
Policy and Xinjiang Conflict.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source : Writers 
E. Conclusion 
The realism perspective in 
international relations considers that the 
state is a rational actor who has the nature 
to maintain his power and (if he can)  
expand. Hardline Policy and China's 
development efforts in the case of 
Xinjiang, can be seen as a form of defense 
against sovereignty. Records of radicalism 
for years can be seen as a rational reason 
for China to take such actions, and in the 
view of the government physical 
development and stimulus of fixed capital 
flows must be done to achieve equity so 
that radicalism or separatism will slowly 
disappear.  
But there is a gap in that thought. 
Since tracing the history of excesses from 
state policies in Xinjiang, development 
inequality appear to be real. The flow of 
capital and infrastructure development 
cannot always maintain as the primary 
solution to this problem. Moreover if 
overcome through coercion and violence 
"Hard Strike" strategy would turn out 
worsen. 
Because inequality has been going 
on for so long and touches on the 
fundamental rights of the Uyghur 
community, which cultivates the fertility 
of radicalism / separatism. such initiatives 
need to be taken with local consideration. 
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This is especially urgent when the change 
widen extant levels of economic 
inequality and when the income 
differentials mirror ethnic cleavages 
(Horowitz 1985). Because for Uyghurs, 
the issue of ethnical discrimination is 
paramount. Especially driven by HAN  
migration to Xinjiang. And once 
radicalism has been embraced, very few 
return to pacifism (Stern,2004). For this 
reason, China's goal should not be to 
convert the violent; rather its goal should 
be to compete with the terrorists for the 
hearts and minds of the broader 
population, upon whom the radicalist rely 
for support. 
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